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Abstract：Under the wholesale price contract, we analyze the influence of the retailer's fairness-concern 
information on the wholesale price, order quantity, the profit of each party and the supply chain in SI 
(Symmetry Information) condition and AI (Asymmetry Information) condition respectively. Then, we 
compute the value of retailer’s fairness-concern information to supplier, and we prove that the profit of all 
members and supply chain is decreasing with retailer’s fairness concern and the profit in SI condition is 
always higher than that in the AI condition. Then, we set the signaling game model to reveal the 
transmission mechanism of retailer’s fairness-concern information, and we analyze the potential separating 
equilibrium and pooling equilibrium existing in signaling model under asymmetric fairness-concern 
information. We prove that only when the signal transmission cost is different between retailers with 
different fairness-concern degree, the signaling model can effectively reveal the role and type of retailers. 
Finally, we provide some suggestions improve fairness-concern information transmission and optimize 
supply chain operation by discussing the condition of each separating equilibrium results. 
Keywords：Fairness concern; Asymmetry information; Wholesale price contract; Signaling game model 
 
Introduction 
Fairness concern has become an important factor in the research of supply chain contract, which can 
provide a solid foundation for the supply chain optimization and management. More and more scholars 
have introduced the fairness-concern into the research field of supply chain contract, and analyzed the 
influence of fairness preference on the value of contract parameters, coordination and operation efficiency 
of supply chain (Cui, 2007；Loch and Wu, 2008；Katok and Pavlov, 2013； Katok, 2014; et al.). Notably, 
wholesale price contracts, especially linear wholesale price contracts, are simple to use in practice as it will 
incur no extra execution cost and require no sharing of sale information between suppliers and retailers 
(Lariviere and Porteus，2001). Under a wholesale price contract, the retailer determines the retail price and 
order quantity based on the wholesale price predetermined by the supplier, and disposes any unsold 
inventory products bearing the full market risk himself (Cachon and Lariviere，2001; Cachon, 2005). This 
might be the reason why the above studies have all focused on the role of wholesale price in supply chain 
coordination.  
There are a lot of researches on the wholesale price contract, which can be divided into two stages:  
① the wholesale price contract under symmetry information of fairness preference, such as  Cui et 
al.(2007), Caliskan-Demirag et al.(2010), Ozgun (2010), Du et al. (2014a，2014b), Hoe et al. (2014), Zhang 
and Ma (2016), and so on；② the wholesale price contract under asymmetry information of fairness 
preference, such as Kalkanci et al.(2011), Katok et al.(2014), Walter & Arnald (2015), Choi and Messinger 
(2016), and so on. Cui et al. (2007) proved that simple constant wholesale price above wholesaler’s 
marginal cost can lead to maximisation of channel profit and utility in a conventional dyadic channel 
with fairness concern. Caliskan-Demirag et al. (2010) extend the research of Cui et al. (2007) by 
considering a few typical nonlinear demand functions and obtain similar results. Ozgun (2010) further 
extend the the research of Cui et al. (2007) by considering exponential demand function, and prove that 
only when the retailer care about the fairness or both the supplier and retailer cared about the fairness, 
the wholesale price could achieve the supply chain coordination, but when only the supplier care about 
the fairness, the wholesale price can not do that, so the Ozgun (2010) further verify the conclusion in Cui 
et al. (2007) and Caliskan-Demirag et al. (2010) that the fairness preference can change the 
coordination virtue of wholesale price contract. Bi et al. (2013) set the mathematical model and adopt 
the numerical simulation to analyse the compact of retailer’s fairness concern on all decisions in 
supply chain and coordination under wholesale price contract. Katok and Pavlov (2013) compare 
performance of three types of contract: wholesale price, buyback and revenue sharing; and suggest 
that although the performance of buyback contract and revenue sharing contract is better than 
wholesale price contract, the performance gap is insignificant.  Du et al. (2014a, 2014b) proved that 
fairness preference can significantly change the equilibrium outcome of supplier-retailer game, and the 
wholesale price contract can achieve competitive supply chain coordination under certain conditions. Wu 
and Niederhoff (2014) check the traditional research on the supply chain under fairness concern in more 
demand distribution functions and prove that the retailer’s fairness concern can improve supply chain 
efficiency only in high uncertain demand and retailer's profit distribution ratio exceeding a certain threshold. 
Qin and Wei (2015) classify the game into four stages according to the retailer’s fairness types and 
symmetry or asymmetry information, and provid the comparative analysis of the decision variables and the 
profit of retailer equity preference behavior impact on supply chain members of the decision in the 
symmetry and asymmetry information. Zhang and Ma (2016) show that the fairness-concern behavior of 
retailers has a significant impact on the wholesale price, retail price and all the marketing effort level 
through the mathematical model and numerical analysis, and fairness-concern behavior of retailer can 
increase their bargaining power in the supply chain. 
② The wholesale price contract under asymmetry information of fairness preference, such as 
Kalkanci et al.(2011), Katok et al.(2014), Walter & Arnald (2015), Choi and Messinger (2016), and so on. 
Kalkanci et al. (2011) add the fairness preference into the wholesale price contract to study the contract 
design under the asymmetric demand information, and they explained the phenomenon in the real market 
why the most supply chain contracts are simple linear structure but not the complex nonlinear structure. 
Katok (2014) study the influence of retailer's fairness concern on both decision making and supply chain 
coordination efficiency through mathematical model and behavioral experiment. Walter & Arnald (2015) 
prove that the decision maker may actively display his own real fairness-concern information so as to 
lessen the limited knowledge of the fairness preference, but he will not compromise the profit distribution 
in the supply chain, which can decrease the efficiency of supply chain coordination and may cause some 
wrong conclusions. Choi and Messinger (2016) apply the experiment method to verified the conclusion in 
Walter & Arnald (2015) and analyze the compact of fairness concern on the each partner’s decision in the 
competitive supply chain and the whole supply chain performance. Cao and Hou (2016) establish a 
principal-agent model and study the retailer's fairness concern on the supply chain decision under 
asymmetric information about the fairness concern. Qing and Li (2016) show that the fairness-concern 
behavior of retailer has a significant impact on the wholesale price, retail price and all the marketing effort 
level through the mathematical model and numerical analysis, and fairness-concern behavior of retailer can 
increase their bargaining power in the supply chain. Qin et al. (2016) analyze the influence of fairness 
concern on the supply chain performance by assuming the cost information is private information. 
It can be seen that there are more and more researches referring the effect of fairness concern on the 
wholesale price contract coordination, but most of them are focusing on the " symmetry information " and 
only few research start to study the "asymmetric information", because the fairness concern is objective and 
private information is generally not symmetric, and the supply chain members only can identify the 
accurate information about fairness concern by some efforts. Although there are few literatures referred to 
the supply chain wholesale price contract under symmetric coordination, but mainly concentrated on the 
asymmetric information about supply chain cost information or promotional effort information, none 
referred to the fairness concern information. Secondly, the existing research on the asymmetric information 
in the supply chain under the wholesale price contract only pay attention to the impact of fairness concern 
on all decisions and profits, but none analyze and compute the fairness preference information value, nor 
establish a signaling game model to reveal the fairness preference information of supply chain members. As 
well known to us, the authenticity problem of fairness concern information is a more basic and important 
problem in the contract design of supply chain, and only when the fairness information is authentic, the 
conclusions and suggestions obtained in the supply chain contract design by considering fairness concern 
will be right and meaningful for real operation management. 
The remainder of the article is structured as follows. Section 2 will set the simple two level supply 
chain made up of one neutral supplier and one fairness concern retailer under wholesale price contract to 
analyze the retailer’s fairness concern on the optimal wholesale price, the retailer's optimal order policy and 
profits of retailer, supplier and the supply chain. In section 3, we will compare the profit and decision 
variables in SI (Symmetry Information) condition and AI (Asymmetry Information) condition so as to 
compute the information value of retailer’s fairness concern to the supplier and thus the supply chain. 
Section 4 will set the signaling game model to reveal the transmission mechanism of retailers' 
fairness-concern information, and we analyze the potential separating equilibrium and pooling equilibrium 
existing in signaling model under asymmetric fairness-concern information. We prove that only when the 
signal transmission cost is different between retailers with different fairness preferences, the signaling 
model can effectively reveal the role and type of retailers. Further, we provide some suggestions in term of 
fairness preference information transmission and optimization of supply chain by discussing the condition 
of each separating equilibrium results. Section 5 will conclude our research and point out the future 
directions. 
 
 
2 The Model 
2.1 Notation description 
As the traditional researches, the supply chain includes a supplier and a retailer, the supplier produces 
only one kind of product and sell the product by retailer. Market demand X is random variable, and 
probability density function and distribution function is ( )f x , ( )F x ( 0x  ). (0) 0F  , ( ) 1 ( )F x F x  . ( )F x
is differentiable, strictly increasing and increasing generalized failure rate (IFGR). c is the unit production 
cost of supplier, and w is the wholesale price of supplier providing to retailer. Before sale season, the 
retailer decides to order the q from the supplier, and expected sale quantity is ( )S q (
0
( ) ( )
q
S q q F x dx   ). If 
the ordered product can’t meet the market demand, the retailer only loss of sale profits, and thus we can 
assume the shortage cost is zero for both supplier and retailer.  
In the end of sale season, if there are some surplus inventories, the retailer will deal with excess 
inventory and bear the market risk by himself completely. It is assumed that the unit residual value of 
surplus products is v ( c v ). Otherwise, the supplier has a profit motive to repurchase the remaining 
inventory at the retailer. p is the sale price and is determined by the external market under perfectly 
competitive market.  denote the profit and u denote the utility. 
The subscript "r, s, sc" represents retailer, supplier, and supply chain respectively, such as s is the 
supplier’s profit. Superscript "SI, AI" denote symmetric information and asymmetric information, " FC" 
denote fairness concern and "*" represents the optimal value. For example, 
*SI FC
ru

means optimal utility of 
the retailer when he pays attention to fairness and this information is asymmetric. 
In the case of centralized decision making, supply chain as a whole to determine sales volume, and the 
total profit function of the supply chain is ( ) ( ) [ ( )]sc q pS q cq v q S q     . It easy to compute
( )
( )(1 ( ))sc
d q
p v F q c v
dq

     , let
( )
0sc
d q
dq

 , and we can get the unique and optimal order quantity as 
following equation (1): 
* 1
sc
p c
q F
p v
    
 
                                                 (1) 
2.2 Wholesale price contract 
Due to the supplier acting in a dominant position in the game, we do not consider the fairness-concern 
behavior of supplier. The retailer is a follower in the game and thus in a weak position of profit allocation 
in supply chain, and therefore the retailer more care about the profit allocation and more care about fairness, 
so here we consider the retailer make order decision to maximize the total utility ru  including his own 
profit and equity (Cui et al. 2007).
  
Fig.1 The time series of the game under the wholesale price contract 
 
The actions of supplier and retailer under the wholesale price contract are as follows:  
① The supplier determines the optimal wholesale pricew  according to the principle of maximizing 
profit; 
② At the time of the sale season, the retailer determines the order *( )p w from the supplier according 
to the market demand forecast, and the supplier can know the response function
*( )p w so as to decides the 
optimal wholesale price *w . Then, the retailer pays the price to the supplier and supplier can obtain the 
revenue immediately. 
③ When demand occurs in the sale season, the retailer sells the product according to the actual 
market and obtains the market sale income. The action process can be shown in fig.1. 
From fig.1, the game process between the supplier and the retailer is a typical two-stage Stackelberg 
game, which can be denoted as { , },( , ), ( , ),s rS R w q u H  . S denotes the supplier, R denotes the retailer, 
and both them are game players. w is the supplier’s strategy selection and q is the retailer’s strategy 
selection. The supplier takes the profit s maximization as the goal, while the retailer takes the total utility 
ru including profit and fair utility as the decision goal. We can solve the perfect Nash equilibrium of sub 
game by backward induction
* * *( , ( ))w p w . 
Under the wholesale price contract, given the wholesale pricew provided by supplier, the profit 
function of retailer and supplier is corresponding as: 
( , ) ( ) [ ( )]r w q pS q wq v q S q                                         (2) 
( , ) ( )s w q w c q                                                   (3) 
The retailer determines the optimal order quantity from the expected profit maximization based on the 
wholesale pricew . For 
2
2
( , )
( ) ( ) 0r
d w q
p v f q
dq

    , the retailer has the unique optimal response function 
subject to
( , )
( )[1 ( )] 0r
d w q
p v F q w v
dq

      , so it can be denoted as 
* 1( )r
p w
q w F
p v
    
 
                                              (4) 
For the supplier has the first decision advantage in the supply chain and thus can obtain more profit 
than retailer, many literatures have proved that although retailer is more close to the market but he is in the 
disadvantaged condition in the profit distribution, so the retailer often would pay attention to compare his 
own profit and supplier’s profit, which is called as fairness preference. The utility function containing the 
retailers' profit and fair disutility can be denoted as following: 
( , ) ( , ) [ ( , ) ( , )]r r s ru w q w q w q w q                                    (5) 
In above formula,  is the retailer’s fairness concern and 0  . 0   indicates that retailer would 
not care about fairness, and only consider his own profit maximization, and the utility function (5) will be 
reduced to the simple profit function ( , ) ( , )r ru w q w q . 0   indicates that retailer will pay attention to 
fairness, and the total utility maximization is including profit and fair disutility in the decision making. The 
bigger   means the retailer care more about the profit allocation, and the unit profit difference between 
supplier and retailer fair can bring greater negative equality effect. 
Take equations (2) and (3) into (5), we can get the utility function as 
( , ) (1 )[ ( ) ( ( ))] ( )ru w q pS q wq v q S q w c q         
Proposition 1  
(1) The retailer of fairness concern has unique optimal order
* ( )FCrq w subjected to 
* 1 ( 2 )( )
(1 )( )
FC
r
p w p w c
q w F
p v


       
  
 
(2) 
* ( )FCrq w is a decreasing function and thus the profit function of retailer, supplier and supply chain 
is decreasing in  , and further deviate from the optimal order quantity of the supply chain. 
Proof. For
2
2
( , )
(1 )( ) ( ) 0r
d u w q
p v f q
dq
     , the retailer has the unique optimal order quantity
* ( )FCrq w
subjected to
( , )
0r
du w q
dq
 .  
*
* 2
2 2 ( )
( )
FC
r
FC
r r
q q w
r
q w u q
u q

 
   
 
  
,
2
2
( , )
0r
u w q
q



, and for 
2 ( , )
( 2 ) ( ) ( )r
u w q
p w c p v F q
q 

    
 
from
( , )
(1 )[( )(1 ( )) ] ( )r
du w q
p v F q w c w c
dq
         , we can take
* 1 ( 2 )( )
(1 )( )
FC
r
p w p w c
q w F
p v


       
  
into
*
* 2
2 2 ( )
( )
FC
r
FC
r r
q q w
r
q w u q
u q

 
   
 
  
and get *
2
( )
( , )
0
1
FC
r
r
q q w
u w q c w
q  
 
 
  
, and thus
*
* 2
2 2 ( )
( )
0FC
r
FC
r r
q q w
r
q w u q
u q

 
   
  
  
, which means 
* ( )FCrq w is a decreasing function in .  
Similarly, we can get * ( ) 0FCr
s s
q q w
q
q
 
  
  
  
  
, * ( ) 0FCr
r r
q q w
q
q
 
  
  
  
  
. 
Finally, for the supply chain profit is strictly concave function and is maximized in
* 1
sc
p c
q F
p v
    
 
, 
so when
*
r scq q , supply chain profit is decreasing in order quantity. By comparing 
* ( )FCrq w and
*
scq ,
* *( )FCr scq w q indicates 
* * ( )( ( )) ( ) 0
(1 )( )
FC
r sc
w c
F q w F q
p v


 
  
 
, and thus we can get * ( ) 0FCr
sc
q q wq





, leading 
to * ( ) 0FCr
sc sc
q q w
q
q
 
  
  
  
  
.  
Similarly, we can prove
* * *( ) ( )FCr r scq w q w q  , which denotes 
* ( )FCrq w will further deviate from the 
optimal order quantity of the supply chain. 
After the supplier knows the fairness concern of retailer, he will decide the wholesale price according 
to 
* 1 ( 2 )( )
(1 )( )
FC
r
p w p w c
q w F
p v


       
  
as following: 
(1 ) (1 )( ) ( )
1 2
SI FC p c p v F qw
  

     

                              (6)  
Take equation into supplier’s profit function (3), we can denote the supplier’s profit by q as 
(1 ) (1 )( ) ( )
( ) ( ) [ ]
1 2
SI FC
s
p c p v F q
q w c q c q
  


        
  
( ) (1 )[ ( )( ( ) ( ) )]
1 2
SI FC
sd q p c p v F q f q q
dq
 


    


 
2
2
( ) (1 )[( )(2 ( ) '( ) )]
0
1 2
SI FC
sd q p v f q f q q
dq
 


   
 

 
Although the supplier can’t determine the order quantity directly, he can change the wholesale price to 
affect the retailer's optimal order quantity. For the supplier, his preference for the optimal order quantity is
* arg max( ( ))SI FC SI FCs sq q
  , which should subject to equation (7). 
* * *( ) ( )SI FC SI FC SI FCs s s
p c
F q f q q
p v
    

                                   (7) 
The retailer chooses the wholesale price under the “IS-FC” as following: 
*
* (1 ) (1 )( ) ( )( )
1 2
SI FC
SI FC SI FC s
s
p c p v F q
w q
  


      

                    (8) 
Proposition 2 Under the condition of fairness concern and symmetry information, the wholesale price 
of supplier selection decreases with fairness preference, but is always higher than its own cost. 
Proof. 
*
2
( ) ( ) ( )
0
(1 2 )
IS FCSI FC
sp c p v F qdw
d 
    
 
 ，
*
* (1 )[ ( ) ( )]( ) 0
1 2
SI FC
SI FC SI FC s
s
p c p v F q
w q c



       
 .
 
3. The information value under asymmetric fairness concern 
Because the supplier has the leading advantage in the supply chain, and the supplier has the right to 
decide the wholesale price under the wholesale price contract. When the retailer knows that the fairness 
preference information about itself, but the supplier does not consider the fairness-concern information of 
retailer and thus supplier makes decision under the assumption that the retailer is neutral and does not pay 
attention to their own profit gap with supplier. 
Since this part is based on the retailer's fairness concern but the supplier considers him to be neutral, 
so the fairness-concern information is asymmetric, denoted as" AI FC ". 
According to the optimal response function
* 1( )r
p w
q w F
p v
    
 
, we can get the one-to-one 
correspondence between the optimal order quantity of the retailer and the wholesale price of the supplier, 
i.e. ( ) ( )w p p v F q   , which can be taken into equation (3), and the supplier’s profit can be denoted by q
as following: 
( ) ( ) [ ( ) ( ) ]AI FCs q w c q p p v F q c q
                                    (9) 
In equation (9) 
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) '( )
AI FC
sd q p p v F q c p v F q q
dq
 
       
2
2
( )
( )[2 ( ) '( )] 0
AI FC
sd q p v f q f q
dq
 
      
For the supplier, the optimal order quantity for him is
* arg max( ( ))AI FCs sq q
   and
( )
0s
d q
dq

 , which is 
equal to 
* * *( ) ( )AI FC AI FC AI FCs s s
p c
F q f q q
p v
    

                                 (10) 
Based on the response function, the supplier would choose the wholesale price as following 
* * *( ) ( ) ( )AI FC AI FCs sw q p p v F q
                                     (11) 
In fact, according to the Stackelberg game, retailer has the following two types of decisions according 
to his own type: When the retailer cares about fairness, he will consider the response function made up of 
his own material gain and fair negative utility to decide the optimal order quantity
* 1 ( 2 )( )
(1 )( )
FC
r
p w p w c
q w F
p v


       
  
, but not based on
* 1( )r
p w
q w F
p v
    
 
to make decision. 
Proposition 3 Under the asymmetric information of the retailer's fairness concern, all the indicators 
such as order quantity, each party's profit and the total profit of the supply chain decreased with the 
retailer's fairness preference except the wholesale price. 
Proof. For * * *( ) ( ) ( )AI FC AI FCs sw q p p v F q
    , 
* * *( ) ( )AI FC AI FC AI FCs s s
p c
F q f q q
p v
    

, and
( ) ( )F x f x x is strictly increasing, so
* *( )AI FCsw q

is not relative to fair preference degree and is unique and 
thus equal to
* 1 ( 2 )( )
(1 )( )
FC
r
p w p w c
q w F
p v


       
  
. According to proposition 1, 
* ( )FCrq w decreases with fair 
preference. 
Here, we can apply numerical analysis and assume that 20p  , 5c  , 3v  , and the market demand 
function is uniform distribution [20,80]X U , i.e. the probability density function of demand function
1
20 80
( ) 60
0
x
f x
otherwise

 
 


, and the corresponding distribution function is
20
20 80
( ) 60
1 80
x
x
F x
x

 
 
 
. The 
numerical analysis on the optimal order quantity, the profits of supplier, retailer and supply chain is in 
table1 including the two conditions where retailer's fairness-concern information is symmetric and 
asymmetric. It is easy to compute the optimal order quantity 70
oq  and the optimal profit of supply chain 
is 1050
o
sc  . 
From table1, we can get some trends for each party as following： 
① For supplier. The supplier’s profit in the SI case is better than the AI case, and the wholesale price 
in SI case is lower than that in AI case. The wholesale price decreases with retailer’s fairness concern both 
in SI and AS cases. When the retailer's fair preference information is asymmetric, wholesale price is always 
constant, because the supplier considers that the retailer is neutral and thus when he decides the wholesale 
price ( ) ( )w p p v F q   , he would not consider fairness. Besides, Fig. 2 indicates the information value of 
the retailer's fairness concern for the supplier, namely IV (Information Value), which is the supplier's profit 
difference after an accurate understanding of the retailer's fair preference information. 
② For retailer, both order quantity and the profit in SI case is higher than that in AI case, and the 
order quantity decreases with fairness concern both in SI and AI case. 
③ For the whole supply chain, the supply chain profit is higher in IS case than that in AI case, and the 
supply chain profit is also decreases with fairness concern both in SI and AI case. 
Thus, all the propositions 1, 2 and 3 are confirmed. 
Additionally, from table 1, we can find that the decreasing extent of order quantity, supplier’s profit, 
retailer’s profit and supply chain profit in AI case are all greater than that in SI case. Therefore, it can 
improve the profit of supply chain members and supply chain by revealing the fairness-concern information.
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Table1 The retailer's fairness concern in SI and AI case 
  
Wholesale 
price 
Order quantity Retailer’s profit Supplier’s profit 
Profit of supply 
chain 
SI AI SI AI SI AI SI AI SI AI 
0 15.50 15.5 35.00 35.00 123.75 123.75 367.50 367.50 491.25 491.25 
0.2 14.00 15.5 33.33 29.17 173.33 118.65 300.00 306.25 473.33 424.90 
0.4 13.17 15.5 32.14 25.00 197.53 108.75 262.50 262.50 460.03 371.25 
0.6 12.64 15.5 31.25 21.88 211.13 97.91 238.64 229.69 449.77 327.60 
0.8 12.27 15.5 30.56 19.44 219.50 87.45 222.12 204.17 441.62 291.62 
1 12.00 15.5 30.00 17.50 225.00 77.81 210.00 183.75 435.00 261.56 
1.2 11.79 15.5 29.55 15.91 228.78 69.08 200.74 167.05 429.51 236.13 
1.4 11.63 15.5 29.17 14.58 231.47 61.22 193.42 153.13 424.90 214.35 
1.8 11.39 15.5 28.57 12.50 234.94 47.81 182.61 131.25 417.55 179.06 
2 11.30 15.5 28.33 11.67 236.08 42.08 178.50 122.50 414.58 164.58 
2.5 11.13 15.5 27.86 10.00 237.97 30.00 170.63 105.00 408.60 135.00 
3 11.00 15.5 27.50 8.75 239.06 20.39 165.00 91.88 404.06 112.27 
 
 
Fig. 2 The information value of fairness concern 
From table 1 and Fig. 2, we can get the following conclusions. 
Conclusion1. All the profit of each party and supply chain in SI case is higher than that in AI 
case, and thus it is necessary to reveal the information about the retailer’s fairness concern so as to 
improve the profit of all members and supply chain. 
Conclusion2. Whether the fairness information is symmetric or asymmetric, all the profit of 
each party and supply chain decreases with fairness preference, and besides, the decreasing speed 
in AI case is more faster and thus the information value increment increases with fairness concern. 
4. Signaling game model 
4.1 Model description 
Because the retailer's fair preference behavior can affect the supplier's profit, as the IV shown 
in Fig. 2, so it is necessary set the signal transmission game model to reveal the fairness-concern 
information. We assume there are two types of retailer , i.e. H type denoting the retailer with 
high degree of fairness concern H , and L , L has the opposite meaning. If the supplier can’t 
distinguish the each retailer’s fairness concern information, then he will provide the average 
wholesale price for both retailers in the game equilibrium. Thus, H type retailer with intense 
fairness concern will actively send some signals about his own fairness preference to the supplier 
to different himself from L  type retailer with lower fairness degree so as to obtain cheaper 
wholesale price which is more matched with his location, contribution and revenue in the supply 
chain. For the equity reference standard of retailer is the direct supplier’s profit, the marginal 
profit is the advance of the total profit and the operation scale of each enterprise is different, so it 
is difficult to analyze the compact of fairness concern on the game process between supplier and 
10 
 
retailer by comparing the total profit between supplier and retailer. Compared with total profit, it is 
easy to compute and compare the marginal profit. For example, the marginal product profit often 
be calculated to determine whether the cooperation in the process of supplier-retailer game, and 
enterprise's profit and revenue can be always calculated based on the marginal product profit and 
product sale prospect. The main focus of this paper is to study the signal transmission of retailer’s 
fairness preference, and thus we simplify the retailer’s utility function as made up of two parts: the 
negative utility caused by the difference of marginal product profit ( ) ( )w c p w   and the 
marginal product profit p w , so the marginal utility of retailer is (1 )( ) ( )ru p w w c       . 
At the same time, because the retailer fairness-concern information will affect the supplier’s 
benefit, as the information value of fairness information illustrated in Fig.2. Here, we will set the 
signaling game model to reveal the retailer’s fairness information, and the fig.3 describes the 
signaling game model, where supplier can allow the retailer to choose the wholesale price so as to 
reveal retailer’s fairness type. 
The fairness preference as the retailer's subjective and psychological preference, which is a 
kind of private information, and the probability distribution of retailer’s type is  P H   and
  1P L    , which is the common knowledge between supplier and retailer.  
The timing of the game between supplier and retailer is as following: 
(1) “Natural” choose retailer type according to the probability distribution of retailer’s type, 
i.e.  P H   and   1P L    , and we assume the fairness-concern degree of H type 
retailer is H , and the fairness-concern degree of L type retailer is L , H L  . 
(2) After the retailer knows his own fairness preference type , he will send the desired 
wholesale price information to the supplier, i.e. Hw or Lw , where Hw denotes the higher 
wholesale price and Lw denotes the lower wholesale price, H Lw w . If the supplier does not 
consider the retailer's fairness concern, the supplier will offer the higher wholesale price to the 
retailer from the second part, and thus the supplier can get more profits by his first mover 
advantage in the game, i.e. H Hp w w c   , which means when the wholesale price is higher, the 
retailer’s marginal profit will be lower than the supplier. Besides, we assume L Lp w w c   , 
otherwise the signal is of no meaning for the supplier. Based on L Lp w w c    , signal 
transmission enables retailer to gain more profit by obtaining lower wholesale price, and change 
the distribution of marginal profit between supplier and retailer to improve their profit distribution 
in the supply chain. In addition, the retailer sending the lower signal Lw can advertise his 
contribution and status in the supply chain, such as the cooperation and later division between 
Gome and GREE, which prove his strong fairness preference once again. We assume the signaling 
cost is LF for the  H type retailer, who is easy to display his own fairness concern, and HF  for 
the L type retailer, which means the retailer with weak fairness preference will pay more cost to 
transfer the same strong signal of fairness preference, i.e. H LF F . Because the retailer of strong 
fairness concern has a more influence on the supplier, so it can be assumed that when the supplier 
cooperate with the retailer of strong fairness concern, the marginal profit is ( )s Hk w c   , where 
Hk denote the influence of retailer with strong fairness concern on supplier's profit. Similarly, 
when the supplier cooperate with the retailer of weak fairness preference, the marginal profit is
( )s Lk w c   , H Lk k . This is why the supplier must recognize the retailer's fairness concern 
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information, for its strong fairness preference of large retailer has more impact on the supplier's 
profit, and from Figure 2, the retailer with strong fairness concern will bring the greater value 
information for the supplier, so it is necessary to identify the fairness preference of retailer. 
(3) After the supplier observe the wholesale price signal, the supplier will judge the type of 
retailer fairness type, and “Y” denote the acceptance and “N” denote the refusal in the extended 
representation of dynamic game in fig.3. Whether or not to accept, the two sides will get some pay 
in the end of the game, denoted as ( , )ri siu   , where the subscript i denote the i th result in the 
game tree, 1, 2,3, 4,5,6,7,8i  . Based on the above assumptions and the game process, we can get 
the dynamic game tree of signal transmission in fig.3. 
 
 
Fig.3. The extended representation of fairness-concern signaling 
In fig.3, N denote the “Nature”, the supplier-retailer game process can be transformed from 
incomplete information game to complete but imperfect information game by introducing the “N” 
to choose the retailer type. “ R ” is the retailer, and “ S ” is the supplier. 
The marginal utility of the retailer and marginal profit of supplier in each final point of game 
tree in Figure 3can be calculated in table2. In fig.3, if supplier refuses the retailer and thus the two 
parts do not cooperate, i.e. 2, 4,6,8i  , the retained payment of the H type retailer is r  and the 
the retained pay of the L type retailer is 'r . Because H type retailer tend to think that his 
contribution to the supply chain is greater, and even if he can’t cooperate with the supplier, there 
are still a lot of opportunities for cooperation, and thus his retained payment is higher, i.e. 
'r r    . The retained payment of supplier is 's . Even if the retailer does not cooperate with 
the retailer after the signal is transmitted, the profit of the retailer with strong fairness concern is 
higher than that of the weak fairness concern, i.e. 'r L r HF F      . 
 
Table 2 The bilateral payment in the signaling game 
 Retailer Supplier 
1i   1 (1 )( ) ( )r H H H Hu p w w c        1 ( )s H Hk w c    
2i   2r ru     2 's s     
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3i   3 (1 )( ) ( )r L H L Hu p w w c        3 ( )s L Hk w c    
4i   4 'r ru     2 's s     
5i   5 (1 )( ) ( )r H L H L Lu p w w c F         5 ( )s H Lk w c    
6i   6r r Lu F     6 's s     
7i   7 (1 )( ) ( )r L L L L Hu p w w c F         7 ( )s L Lk w c    
8i   8 'r r Hu F     8 's s     
In the signaling model of fig.3, the two decision nodes of the dotted line belong to the same 
set of information, which means that the supplier can only observe the retailer's hope for the 
wholesale price, without knowing the retailer's fairness preference type, i.e. although supplier see 
the signal Hw , he does not know whether the H type retailer sending or the L type retailer 
sending. So only after the supplier observe the wholesale price requirement, he can infer the detail 
type of retailer according to the original information of retailer, and then make decision 
maximizing his profit. 
4.2 Model analysis 
For the fig.3 and the game description, the signal transmission game model of fairness 
preference is an imperfect information and dynamic game, and therefore we can solve the perfect 
Bias equilibrium strategy in fig.3, the steps are as follows: 1) seek the perfect Bias equilibrium 
dependent on the belief of supplier “S”; 2) seek the perfect Bias equilibrium dependent on the 
belief of retailer “R”; 3) seek the perfect Bias equilibrium of both sides. The computation result is 
shown in table 3 and table 4, and the detail computation process can be seen in appendix. 
Table 3 The perfect Bias pooling equilibrium strategy ( PE ) of both sides 
Equilibrium Retailer’s 
strategy 
Supplier’s 
strategy 
Belief 
1PE  1( ) ( , )H Hs w w   2 ( ) ( , )s w Y Y  1  ， 2
' ( )
1
( )( )
s L L
H L L
k w c
k k w c


  
 
 
 
2PE  1( ) ( , )L Ls w w   2 ( ) ( , )s w Y Y  1
' ( )
1
( )( )
s L H
H L H
k w c
k k w c


  
 
 
，
2   
3PE  1( ) ( , )H Hs w w   2 ( ) ( , )s w N N  1
' ( )
0
( )( )
s L H
H L H
k w c
k k w c


  
 
 
，
2   
4PE  1( ) ( , )H Hs w w   2 ( ) ( , )s w N Y  1  ， 2
' ( )
1
( )( )
s L L
H L L
k w c
k k w c


  
 
 
 
5PE  1( ) ( , )L Ls w w   2 ( ) ( , )s w N Y  1
' ( )
0
( )( )
s L H
H L H
k w c
k k w c


  
 
 
，
2   
6PE  1( ) ( , )H Hs w w   2 ( ) ( , )s w Y N  1  ， 2
' ( )
0
( )( )
s L L
H L L
k w c
k k w c


  
 
 
 
7PE  1( ) ( , )L Ls w w   2 ( ) ( , )s w Y N  1
' ( )
1
( )( )
s L H
H L H
k w c
k k w c


  
 
 
，
2   
 
 
Table 4 The perfect Bias separating equilibrium strategy ( SE ) of both sides 
Equilibrium Retailer’s 
strategy 
Supplier’s 
strategy 
Belief Constraints  
1SE  1( ) ( , )L Hs w w   2 ( ) ( , )s w Y Y  
1 1   
2 0   1 2 1 2
L H
H L
H L
F F
w w
 
  
   
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2SE  1( ) ( , )L Hs w w   2 ( ) ( , )s w N Y  
1 1   
2 0   
' (1 )( ) ( )r H L L L LF p w w c          
(1 )( ) ( )r L H L H LF p w w c          
3SE  1( ) ( , )L Hs w w   2 ( ) ( , )s w Y N  
1 1   
2 0   
' ( )s L Hk w c    
' ( )s H Lk w c    
From table 3, table 4 and appendix, there are 7 kinds of pooling equilibrium ( PE ) in the 
dynamic game of imperfect information between the supplier and the retailer under the 
fairness-concern information. i.e. 1PE (as ① in the appendix), 2PE (②), 3PE (④), 4PE (⑤),
5PE（⑥）, 6PE (⑧), 7PE (⑨) and 3 kinds of separating equilibrium ( SE ), i.e. 1SE (③)、 2SE (⑦)、
3SE (⑩). In the pooling equilibriums, the wholesale price signal sent by the retailer can’t transmit 
more information about the retailer type to the supplier, i.e. the signal does not update the 
information on the probability of probability distribution of natural retailer’s fairness-concern type, 
so the supplier still can’t distinguish between retailers of different fairness concern. However, 
under the 3 separation equilibriums, the supplier can distinguish the retailers with different 
fairness concern through the wholesale price signal transmitted by the retailer. By comparison of 
three equilibriums, we can find: 
For 1SE : 1( ) ( , )L Hs w w  , 1 1  , 2 0  , 2 ( ) ( , )s w Y Y , the retailer with strong fairness 
concern require low wholesale prices and the retailer with weak fairness concern accept high 
wholesale price. Once the supplier sees Lw , he will think that the retailer is a strong 
fairness-concern type and accepts the retailer's low price requirement, and when he sees Hw , he 
will think that the retailer is a weak fairness-concern type and accepts the retailer's high price 
requirement. 
For the prerequisite of 1SE :
1 2 1 2
L H
H L
H L
F F
w w
 
  
 
, in the actual operation of the supply 
chain management, the signaling cost of strong fairness preference LF is lower, the greater the 
degree H of fairness concern (corresponding to larger Hk ), or signaling cost of weak fairness 
preference HF  is high, the fairness-concern degree L  is smaller (the corresponding smaller Lk ) 
appear, the possibility of 1SE appearing is bigger , and at the same time, the possibility of 2SE and
3SE  is smaller. 
For 2SE : 1( ) ( , )L Hs w w  , 1 1  , 2 0  , 2 ( ) ( , )s w N Y , the retailer with strong fairness 
concern require low wholesale price and the retailer with weak fairness concern accept high 
wholesale price. Once the supplier sees Lw , he will think that the retailer is a strong 
fairness-concern type but reject the retailer's low price requirement, and when he sees Hw , he will 
think that the retailer is a weak fairness-concern type and accepts the retailer's high price 
requirement. In this equilibrium, the supplier does not want to cooperate with the retailer of strong 
fairness concern, and does not want to make profit sharing with retailer. For retailer, the higher 
wholesale prices will lead to greater negative fairness utility, and thus the retailer of strong 
fairness concern will not accept a higher wholesale price, so there will be no cooperation between 
supplier and retailer. 
For 3SE : 1( ) ( , )L Hs w w  , 1 1  , 2 0  , 2 ( ) ( , )s w Y N , the retailer with strong fairness concern 
require low wholesale price and the retailer with weak fairness concern accept high wholesale 
price. Once the supplier sees Lw , he will think that the retailer is a strong fairness-concern type and 
accepts the retailer's low price requirement, and when he sees Hw , he will think that the retailer is a 
weak fairness-concern type and rejects the retailer's high price requirement. Contrary to 2SE , the 
supplier is not only concerned with more profit brought by higher wholesale prices but he is more 
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concerned with cooperation of powerful retailer, who can bring long-term profit by the strong 
market influence. So the supplier can tolerate retailer’s lower wholesale price requirement, reduce 
his marginal product profit, increase the retailer's marginal product profit and utility, bring more 
efforts to encourage retailer selling product, so as to increase the total profit. The supplier will not 
cooperate with the retailer of weak fairness concern who has little influence on the supply chain, 
even the retailer can accept higher wholesale price. So the 3SE  can explain the real business, 
where supplier would prefer to cooperate with the large retailer, endure the retailer’s lower price 
and the various fees but do not choose to cooperate with the small retailers. 
Among 1SE , 2SE and 3SE , the separating equilibrium 1SE is the equilibrium state that supply 
chain wish, which means the retailer with strong fairness concern often has more strong 
competitiveness and more bargaining ability in the supply chain, and thus the supplier does not 
want to be revenged by retailer caused by unfair revenue distribution, leading to worsening the 
profit of both sides, so the supplier is willing to offer lower wholesale price contract for the 
retailer with strong fairness concern. At the same time, the retailer with strong fairness concern 
feels more equitable distribution to make more hard effort to sell product due to retailer’s strong 
contribution, status and large market influence in the supply chain, and finally to achieve the 
Pareto improvement of supply chain revenue. On the contrary, the retailer with weak fairness 
concern has no sufficient ability to influence the profit of supplier due to the weak negotiation 
ability, status and small market influence in the supply chain, and thus the supplier can provide a 
higher wholesale price for the retailer with weak fairness concern so as to earn more profits by his 
first mover advantage. And then, if the separating equilibrium 1SE appear, retailer with strong 
fairness concern will establish a cooperation relationship with supplier, and it is easy to find that 
the profit of supply chain is reduced by
LF  compared with the condition of symmetric information, 
and 
LF is just the loss of supply chain efficiency caused by asymmetric information of retailer's 
fairness concern, which is just the influence of incomplete information on the efficiency of 
supplier-retailer game. 
 
   
So we can get the conclusion 3 as follows: 
Conclusion3: When one or both of the following conditions are met, the supplier can 
distinguish the fairness type of retailers and provide the appropriate wholesale price for the 
retailers with different fairness concern, and promote the stable and harmonious development of 
the supply chain channel. 
i) When the signal transmission cost difference between retailers with different fairness 
concern is obvious, i.e. the retailer with weak fairness concern has so high signal transmission cost 
to just obtain higher wholesale price and the retailer with strong fairness concern has so low signal 
transmission cost to get the lower wholesale price. 
ii) When the market influence of the retailer with strong fairness concern is far greater than 
that of retailer with weak fairness concern, the retailer with strong fairness concern can get the 
lower wholesale price. 
5. Conclusion 
We analyze the influence of the retailer's fairness concern on the wholesale price, order 
quantity, the profit of each party and the supply chain in SI condition and AI condition 
respectively under the wholesale price contract. Then, we compute the value of retailer’s 
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fairness-concern information to supplier, and we prove that the profit of all members and supply 
chain is decreasing with retailer’s fairness concern and the profit in SI condition is always higher 
than that in the AI condition. Then, we set the signaling game model to reveal the transmission 
mechanism of retailers' fairness preference information, and we analyze the potential separating 
equilibrium and pooling equilibrium existing in signaling model under asymmetric 
fairness-concern information. We prove that only when the signal transmission cost is different 
between retailers with different fairness preferences, the signaling model can effectively reveal the 
role and type of retailers. Finally, we provide some suggestions in term of fairness-concern 
information transmission and optimization of supply chain by discussing the condition of each 
separating equilibrium results so as to provide some scientific reference value for the actual 
operation in the supply chain. For example, we proved that when the signal transmission cost 
difference between retailers with different fairness preference is obvious, i.e. the retailer with 
weak fairness concern has so high signal transmission cost to just obtain higher wholesale price 
and the retailer with strong fairness concern has so low signal transmission cost to get the lower 
wholesale price. By the signaling model, the supplier can distinguish the fairness type of retailers 
and provide the appropriate wholesale price for the retailers with different fairness preference, and 
promote the stable and harmonious development of the supply chain channel. Besides, we explain 
the real business, where supplier would prefer to cooperate with the large retailer, endure the 
retailer’s lower price and the various fees but do not choose to cooperate with the small retailers.   
The authenticity problem of fairness preference information is a more basic problem 
compared with the coordination problem of supply chain, and only when the fairness preference 
information is true, the conclusions obtained in supply chain coordination under fairness 
preference is meaningful. Although this paper computed the information value of fairness concern 
by numerical analysis and we set the signaling model to solve the adverse selection problem of 
asymmetric information under retailer’s fairness concern, which can enrich and expand the 
research of supply chain contract. But this paper uses so many parameters and symbols in order to 
get revealing mechanism of fairness preference types, and thus it is difficult to apply numerical 
analysis about the signaling model to get the intuitive management implications, so future research 
can simplify the model parameters so as to enhance the maneuverability of the model.  
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Appendix： 
1) Seek the perfect Bias equilibrium dependent on the belief of supplier “S”.  
First, we will provide the initial judgment of the two information nodes when the supplier is 
just in the decision node “S” which includes two corresponding information nodes, as shown in 
fig.3.  
This paper first gives the initial judgment of the two information section for supplier "S" who 
contains two information codes. 
1 and 11  is the probability referred by supplier about the 
retailer with strong fairness concern and weak fairness concern accordingly when the supplier sees 
the high wholesale price requirement
Hw . Similarly, 2 and 21   is the probability referred by 
supplier about the retailer with strong fairness concern and weak fairness concern accordingly 
when the supplier sees the low wholesale price requirement
Lw . Then, when the supplier gets the 
signal
Hw , i.e. Hw w , the maximizing decision problem of supplier is as follows: 
 
 
1 1 1 3 1 2 1 4
1 1
max (1 ) , (1 )
max ( ) (1 ) ( ), '
s s s s
H H L H sk w c k w c
       
  
       
     
 
We can get the belief dependent strategy of supplier is 
1
1
1
' ( )
( )( )
( )
' ( )
( )( )
s L H
H L H
H
s L H
H L H
k w c
Y if
k k w c
w
k w c
N if
k k w c





  
  
 
   
  
 
Similarly, when the supplier gets the signal
Lw , i.e. Lw w , the maximizing decision problem 
of supplier is  
 
 
2 5 2 7 2 6 2 8
2 2
max (1 ) , (1 )
max ( ) (1 ) ( ), '
s s s s
H L L L sk w c k w c
       
  
       
     
 
 
Which is equal to the equation:
2
2
2
' ( )
( )( )
( )
' ( )
( )( )
s L L
H L L
L
s L L
H L L
k w c
Y if
k k w c
w
k w c
N if
k k w c





  
  
 
   
  
 
 
Then, We will get the perfect Bias Nash equilibrium strategy 
1 2( ( ), ( ))H Lw w    dependent 
on the belief of supplier by discussing the combination of 
1( )Hw and 2 ( )Lw , as follows: 
1 2 1 1 2 2
' ( ) ' ( )
( , ) 1 ,1 , ( ) ( , )
( )( ) ( )( )
s L H s L L
H L H H L L
k w c k w c
D s w Y Y
k k w c k k w c
 
    
      
        
    
      (1) 
1 2 2 1 2 2
' ( ) ' ( )
( , ) 0 ,0 , ( ) ( , )
( )( ) ( )( )
s L H s L L
H L H H L L
k w c k w c
D s w N N
k k w c k k w c
 
    
      
        
    
    (2) 
1 2 3 1 2 2
' ( ) ' ( )
( , ) 0 ,1 , ( ) ( , )
( )( ) ( )( )
s L H s L L
H L H H L L
k w c k w c
D s w N Y
k k w c k k w c
 
    
      
        
    
     (3) 
1 2 4 1 2 2
' ( ) ' ( )
( , ) 1 ,0 , ( ) ( , )
( )( ) ( )( )
s L H s L L
H L H H L L
k w c k w c
D s w Y N
k k w c k k w c
 
    
      
        
    
     (4) 
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2) Seek the perfect Bias equilibrium dependent on the belief of retailer “R”. 
We will get the perfect Bias Nash equilibrium strategy dependent on the belief of retailer “R” 
in each regions 
jD ( 1,2,3,4j  ) respectively. Specifically, in the first phase of the game, the 
retailer's equilibrium strategy
1( )s   based on his own fairness type corresponding to each 
supplier’s strategy
2 ( )s w in each 1 2( , ) jD    ( 1,2,3,4j  ). 
2.1) 
1 2 1( , ) D     
When 1 2 1( , ) D    , 2 ( ) ( , )s w Y Y  by formula (1), i.e. whether the retailer sends out the 
signal Hw w or Lw w , the supplier always accept the wholesale price requirement and will deal 
with both types of retailers. Under 2 ( ) ( , )s w Y Y , if H  denoting the retailer is of strong fairness 
concern, then his decision problem is as follows: 
   1 5max , max (1 )( ) ( ), (1 )( ) ( )r r H H H H H L H L Lu u p w w c p w w c F                
Based on the assumption that the supplier always chooses “Y”, the retailer will compare the 
utility of sending signals
Hw w and Lw w , i.e. 
1
1 2
( )
1 2
L
H H L
H
L
L H L
H
F
w ifw w
H
F
w ifw w




  
 
  
 
                                (5) 
Similarly, we can compute the decision problem when the retailer is of weak fairness concern
L  under 2 ( ) ( , )s w Y Y , i.e. 
   3 7max , max (1 )( ) ( ), (1 )( ) ( )r r L H L H L L L L Hu u p w w c p w w c F                
Similar to the equation (5), the strategy dependent on the belief of retailer with weak fairness 
concern is as follows: 
1
1 2
( )
1 2
H
H H L
L
H
L H L
L
F
w ifw w
L
F
w ifw w




  
 
  
 
                              (6) 
According to equation (5), (6) and the hypothetical condition
H LF F  and H Lw w , we can 
get the separating equilibrium (shorted as SE ) and pooling equilibrium ( PE ) of supplier-retailer 
game by discussion in each situations. 
① when
1 2
L
H L
H
F
w w

 

, 
1 2
H
H L
L
F
w w

 

is always correct, and therefore the retailer will 
have PE  strategy denoted as
1( ) ( , )H Hs w w  , which means both the retailers will choose to send 
the signal
Hw whether the type of retailer is strong fairness concern or weak fairness concern. 
② when
1 2
H
H L
L
F
w w

 

,
1 2
L
H L
H
F
w w

 

 is always correct, and therefore the retailer will 
have PE  strategy
1( ) ( , )L Ls w w   which means both the retailers will choose to send the signal
Lw whether the type of retailer is strong fairness concern or weak fairness concern. 
③ when 
1 2 1 2
L H
H L
H L
F F
w w
 
  
 
，the retailer will have SE  strategy
1( ) ( , )L Hs w w  , 
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which means the retailer with strong fairness concern will send the signal 
Lw  and the retailer 
with weak fairness concern will choose to send the signal
Hw . 
2.2) 
1 2 2( , ) D     
When
1 2 2( , ) D   
, 
2 ( ) ( , )s w N N
 by formula (2), i.e. whether the retailer sends out the 
signal Hw w or Lw w , the supplier always rejects the wholesale price requirement and will refuse 
to deal with both types of retailers. Under
2 ( ) ( , )s w N N
, if H  denoting the retailer is of strong 
fairness concern, then his decision problem is as follows: 
   2 6max , max ,r r r r L ru u F           
It is easy to get
1( ) HH w  , and then the retailer with strong fairness concern will send the 
signal
Hw  under 2 ( ) ( , )s w N N .  
if L  , then the decision problem of retailer is: 
   4 8max , max ', ' 'r r r r L ru u F           
It is easy to get
1( ) HL w  , and then the retailer with weak fairness concern will send the 
signal
Hw  under 2 ( ) ( , )s w N N . 
④ when 
1 2 2( , ) D    , we can get the PE  strategy, i.e. 1( ) ( , )H Hs w w  . 
2.2) 
1 2 3( , ) D     
When 
1 2 3( , ) D   
, 
2 ( ) ( , )s w N Y
 by formula (3), i.e. if the supplier sees the signal
Hw
, 
he will reject, and if supplier sees the signal
Lw
, he will accept. If H  , the retailer with strong 
fairness concern will decide the following decision problem: 
   2 5max , max ,(1 )( ) ( )r r r H L H L Lu u p w w c F            
And then 
1
(1 )( ) ( )
( )
(1 )( ) ( )
H r L H L H L
L r L H L H L
w if F p w w c
H
w if F p w w c
  

  
      
 
      
                             (7) 
Similarly, when L  , the retailer with weak fairness concern will decide the following 
decision problem: 
   4 7max , max ', (1 )( ) ( )r r r L L L L Hu u p w w c F          
 
Similar to equation (7), we can get 
1
' (1 )( ) ( )
( )
' (1 )( ) ( )
H r H L L L L
L r H L L L L
w if F p w w c
L
w if F p w w c
  

  
      
 
      
                             (8) 
According to equation (7), (8) and the hypothetical condition
H LF F , H Lw w , L Lp w w c    
and 'r r    , we can get the retailer’s strategy as follows: 
 
⑤  when (1 )( ) ( )r L H L H LF p w w c         , the retailer will have PE strategy: 
1( ) ( , )H Hs w w  . 
⑥  when ' (1 )( ) ( )r H L L L LF p w w c         , the retailer will have SE  strategy 
1( ) ( , )L Ls w w  . 
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⑦ when ' (1 )( ) ( )r H L L L LF p w w c         and (1 )( ) ( )r L H L H LF p w w c         , the 
retailer will have PE strategy:
1( ) ( , )L Hs w w  . 
2.2）
1 2 4( , ) D     
When 
1 2 4( , ) D   
, 2 ( ) ( , )s w Y N  by formula (4), i.e. if the supplier sees the signal
Hw
, 
he will accept, and if supplier sees the signal
Lw
, he will reject. If H  , the retailer with strong 
fairness concern will decide the following decision problem: 
   1 6max , max (1 )( ) ( ),r r H H H H r Lu u p w w c F            
Then  
1
(1 )( ) ( )
( )
(1 )( ) ( )
H r L H H H H
L r L H H H H
w if F p w w c
H
w if F p w w c
  

  
      
 
      
                      (9) 
If L  , the retailer with weak fairness concern will decide the following decision problem: 
 
   3 8max , max (1 )( ) ( ), 'r r L H L H r Hu u p w w c F            
1
' (1 )( ) ( )
( )
' (1 )( ) ( )
H r H L H L H
L r H L H L H
w if F p w w c
L
w if F p w w c
  

  
      
 
      
                     (10) 
According to equation (9), (10) and the hypothetical condition
H LF F , H Lw w  and
'r r    , we can get the retailer’s strategy as follows: 
⑧  when (1 )( ) ( )r L H H H HF p w w c         , the retailer will have PE strategy:
1( ) ( , )H Hs w w  . 
⑨  when ' (1 )( ) ( )r H L H L HF p w w c         , the retailer will have PE strategy:
1( ) ( , )L Ls w w  . 
⑩when (1 )( ) ( )r L H H H HF p w w c         and ' (1 )( ) ( )r H L H L HF p w w c         , the 
retailer will have SE strategy:
1( ) ( , )L Hs w w  . 
3) Seek the perfect Bias equilibrium of both sides. 
According to the strategies 
2 ( )s w and 1( )s  dependent of supplier’s and retailer’s belief, we 
can further solve the perfect Bayesian equilibrium strategies in each region jD ( 1,2,3,4j  )for 
dynamic game under the imperfect fairness information. 
①when
1 2 1( , ) D    , 2 ( ) ( , )s w Y Y and 
1 2
L
H L
H
F
w w

 

, 
1( ) ( , )H Hs w w  , the deduction 
or belief about the type of retailer’s fairness concern should meet: 1
' ( )
1
( )( )
s L H
H L H
k w c
k k w c

 
  
  
 
 
and 2
' ( )
1
( )( )
s L L
H L L
k w c
k k w c


  
 
 
, and then if
' ( )
( )( )
s L H
H L H
k w c
k k w c


  

 
and 2
' ( )
1
( )( )
s L L
H L L
k w c
k k w c


  
 
 
, we can 
get the 1PE  under the imperfect fairness information. 
1PE ：
1( ) ( , )H Hs w w  ， 1  ， 2
' ( )
1
( )( )
s L L
H L L
k w c
k k w c


  
 
 
，
2 ( ) ( , )s w Y Y   
② when
1 2 1( , ) D    , 2 ( ) ( , )s w Y Y  and 
1 2
H
H L
L
F
w w

 

, 
1( ) ( , )L Ls w w  . The belief 
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about the type of retailer’s fairness concern should meet: 
1
' ( )
1
( )( )
s L H
H L H
k w c
k k w c


  
 
 
 and
2
' ( )
1
( )( )
s L L
H L L
k w c
k k w c

 
  
  
 
. Then, if 
1
' ( )
1
( )( )
s L H
H L H
k w c
k k w c


  
 
 
and 
' ( )
( )( )
s L L
H L L
k w c
k k w c


  

 
, then we 
can get the 2PE as follows: 
2PE ：
1( ) ( , )L Ls w w  , 1
' ( )
1
( )( )
s L H
H L H
k w c
k k w c


  
 
 
, 
2  , 2 ( ) ( , )s w Y Y  
③  When 
1 2 1( , ) D    , 2 ( ) ( , )s w Y Y ,
1 2 1 2
L H
H L
H L
F F
w w
 
  
 
,
1( ) ( , )L Hs w w  , The 
belief about the type of retailer’s fairness concern should meet: 
1
' ( )
1
( )( )
s L H
H L H
k w c
k k w c


  
 
 
 and
2
' ( )
0
( )( )
s L L
H L L
k w c
k k w c


  
 
 
. if 
1 2 1 2
L H
H L
H L
F F
w w
 
  
 
, there 1SE（Separating Equilibrium，SE）: 
1SE :
1( ) ( , )L Hs w w  , 1 1  , 2 0  , 2 ( ) ( , )s w Y Y  
④ When
1 2 2( , ) D    , 2 ( ) ( , )s w N N ， 1( ) ( , )H Hs w w  . The belief about the type of 
retailer’s fairness concern should meet: 
1
' ( )
0
( )( )
s L H
H L H
k w c
k k w c


  
 
 
and
2
' ( )
0
( )( )
s L L
H L L
k w c
k k w c

 
  
  
 
. 
Then, if 
1
' ( )
0
( )( )
s L H
H L H
k w c
k k w c


  
 
 
and
' ( )
( )( )
s L L
H L L
k w c
k k w c


  

 
, we can get 3PE : 
3PE : 
1( ) ( , )H Hs w w  , 1
' ( )
0
( )( )
s L H
H L H
k w c
k k w c


  
 
 
, 
2  , 2 ( ) ( , )s w N N  
⑤  When 
1 2 3( , ) D    , 2 ( ) ( , )s w N Y , and if (1 )( ) ( )r L H L H LF p w w c         ,
1( ) ( , )H Hs w w  , then the belief is 1
' ( )
0
( )( )
s L H
H L H
k w c
k k w c

 
  
  
 
,
2
' ( )
1
( )( )
s L L
H L L
k w c
k k w c


  
 
 
and
(1 )( ) ( )r L H L H LF p w w c         , and the 4PE : 
4PE : 
1( ) ( , )H Hs w w  , 1  , 2
' ( )
1
( )( )
s L L
H L L
k w c
k k w c


  
 
 
, 
2 ( ) ( , )s w N Y  
⑥  When 1 2 3( , ) D    , 2 ( ) ( , )s w N Y , and if ' (1 )( ) ( )r H L L L LF p w w c        
1( ) ( , )L Ls w w  , then the belief is 
1
' ( )
0
( )( )
s L H
H L H
k w c
k k w c


  
 
 
, 
2
' ( )
1
( )( )
s L L
H L L
k w c
k k w c

 
  
  
 
. Then 
under the constraints:
1
' ( )
0
( )( )
s L H
H L H
k w c
k k w c


  
 
 
,
2
' ( )
1
( )( )
s L L
H L L
k w c
k k w c


  
 
 
and
' (1 )( ) ( )r H L L L LF p w w c         , we can get 5PE : 
5PE :
1( ) ( , )L Ls w w  , 1
' ( )
0
( )( )
s L H
H L H
k w c
k k w c


  
 
 
, 
2  , 2 ( ) ( , )s w N Y  
⑦  when
1 2 3( , ) D    , 2 ( ) ( , )s w N Y , and if ' (1 )( ) ( )r H L L L LF p w w c         ,
(1 )( ) ( )r L H L H LF p w w c         , 1( ) ( , )L Hs w w  . Then the belief is 
1
' ( )
1
( )( )
s L H
H L H
k w c
k k w c


  
 
 
, and 2
' ( )
0
( )( )
s L L
H L L
k w c
k k w c


  
 
 
. So when
' (1 )( ) ( )r H L L L LF p w w c          and (1 )( ) ( )r L H L H LF p w w c         , we can get 2SE : 
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2SE :
1( ) ( , )L Hs w w  , 1 1  , 2 0  , 2 ( ) ( , )s w N Y  
⑧  when 
1 2 4( , ) D    , 2 ( ) ( , )s w Y N , and if (1 )( ) ( )r L H H H HF p w w c         ,
1( ) ( , )H Hs w w  , Then the belief is 1
' ( )
1
( )( )
s L H
H L H
k w c
k k w c

 
  
  
 
and
2
' ( )
0
( )( )
s L L
H L L
k w c
k k w c


  
 
 
. So 
when
' ( )
( )( )
s L H
H L H
k w c
k k w c


  

 
,
2
' ( )
0
( )( )
s L L
H L L
k w c
k k w c


  
 
 
and (1 )( ) ( )r L H H H HF p w w c          , 
we can get 6PE ： 
6PE ：
1( ) ( , )H Hs w w  ， 1  ， 2
' ( )
0
( )( )
s L L
H L L
k w c
k k w c


  
 
 
，
2 ( ) ( , )s w Y N  
⑨  when 
1 2 4( , ) D    , 2 ( ) ( , )s w Y N , and if ' (1 )( ) ( )r H L H L HF p w w c         ,
1( ) ( , )L Ls w w  , Then the belief is 1
' ( )
1
( )( )
s L H
H L H
k w c
k k w c


  
 
 
and
2
' ( )
0
( )( )
s L L
H L L
k w c
k k w c

 
  
  
 
. So 
when ' (1 )( ) ( )r H L H L HF p w w c         , 1
' ( )
1
( )( )
s L H
H L H
k w c
k k w c


  
 
 
and
' ( )
( )( )
s L L
H L L
k w c
k k w c


  

 
, we 
can get 7PE ： 
7PE : 
1( ) ( , )L Ls w w  , 1
' ( )
1
( )( )
s L H
H L H
k w c
k k w c


  
 
 
, 
2  , 2 ( ) ( , )s w Y N  
⑩  when 
1 2 4( , ) D    , 2 ( ) ( , )s w Y N , and if (1 )( ) ( )r L H H H HF p w w c         ,
' (1 )( ) ( )r H L H L HF p w w c         and 1( ) ( , )L Hs w w  , Then the belief is
1
' ( )
0
( )( )
s L H
H L H
k w c
k k w c


  
 
 
and
2
' ( )
1
( )( )
s L L
H L L
k w c
k k w c


  
 
 
, we can get 3SE ： 
3SE :
1( ) ( , )L Hs w w  , 1 1  , 2 0  , 2 ( ) ( , )s w Y N . 
 
 
 
 
 
